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1. – Introduction 
International law has restricted States’ national sovereignty by according rights 
to refugees.1  A State’s responsibility to respect and protect those rights is triggered 
whenever a refugee finds himself within that State’s jurisdiction. 
However, this jurisdiction-based criterion for responsibility allocation, com-
bined with States’ migration policies directed at avoiding responsibility by keeping 
refugees out of their jurisdiction, have led to an unequal distribution of responsi-
bilities for refugee protection among States.  International refugee law has not de-
veloped a distribution mechanism for States to each take up an equitable share of 
the responsibilities towards refugees. The result is a continued asymmetric burden 
on countries of first asylum or transit: 84 percent of the world’s refugees are in 
developing countries.2    
Despite some successful historical precedents and recent endeavours in develop-
ing a responsibility-sharing framework,3 the political will to structurally handle the 
issue and to go beyond ad hoc emergency systems and voluntary pledges seems to 
be lacking.4  
 
1
 The term ‘refugee’ is used in the chapter in its broadest sense, including not only recognised status-
holders under the 1951 Refugee Status Convention, but also de facto refugees who are not recognised as 
such, holders of a regional protection status (e.g. subsidiary protection in the EU) and other forcibly dis-
placed migrants. Refugee law also deals with forcibly displaced migrants that are not Convention-refugees, 
but are protected under regional ‘international protection’ law or international human rights law.  
2
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), Global Trends. Forced Displacement 
in 2018, 2019, p. 18, available at: <www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018>.   For numbers on the unequal dis-
tribution of asylum applicants, refugees and other ‘burdens’ related to refugee protection within the EU, 
see: WAGNER, KRALER, BAUMGARTNER, “Solidarity – an Integral and Basic concept of the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System”, ICMPD Working Paper, June 2018, available at: <ceaseval.eu/publications>.  
3
 For an overview of historical precedents: SUHRKE, “Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: 
The Logic of Collective versus National Action”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 1998, p. 396 ff.; TÜRK and 
GARLICK, “From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2016, p. 656 ff. 
The most recent global initiative is the UN Global Compact on Refugees: Report of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees Part II Global Compact on Refugees, UN Doc. A/73/12 (Part II) (2018). 
4
 Examples of critique on the lack of political commitments: DURIEUX, “‘Success under the GCR’: 
Can it be measured?”, RLI Blog on Refugee Law and Forced Migration, 29 January 2019, available at: 
<rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2019/01/29/success-under-the-gcr-can-it-be-measured>; COSTELLO, “Refugees and 
(Other) Migrants: Will the Global Compacts Ensure Safe Flight and Onward Mobility for Refugees?”, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018, p. 1 ff., p. 5; DOWD and MCADAM, “International Cooperation 
And Responsibility-sharing To Protect Refugees: What, Why And How?”,  International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 2017, p. 863 ff., pp. 865-866; European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), “ECRE 
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This chapter looks at international jurisprudence for potential solutions. Have in-
ternational and regional courts come up with criteria for responsibility allocation 
other than territorial jurisdiction?   
A first avenue this chapter looks into is the evolving concept of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in international human rights law, and its potential beyond the models of 
spatial and personal control. Besides those developments related to extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, there is little international case-law that deals directly with refugee 
rights or even migration issues, let alone with issues related to non-substantive rights 
such as the inter-state distribution of refugee protection obligations.5   
The chapter therefore also analyses two other legal mechanisms from general and 
other branches of international law, which encompass criteria to attribute or allocate 
responsibilities to States beyond their jurisdictions. First, I asses the principles of 
cooperation and solidarity and their implementation in international and regional ref-
ugee and human rights law, to enquire its potential beyond voluntary commitments 
in crisis situations. Then, I evaluate the potential of the Responsibility to Protect-
doctrine and the specific obligations it imposes on States to help other States protect-
ing populations against atrocities.  
The findings of the chapter are no ready-made solution that provides global ref-
ugee protection policy with an allocation mechanism that is structural, a priori, eq-
uitable and legally enforceable. This is a mapping exercise in which I want to assess 
under which conditions the proposed mechanisms might apply by analogy to inter-
national refugee law and what the assets and obstacles are for each mechanism’s 
legal viability in global refugee protection. 
Whether the alternative criteria also have the legal potential to eventually bring 
about an equitable distribution of refugee protection burdens among States, or 
whether they might be usefully deployed in litigation settings by individual refugee 
or hosting States against (other) States: those are questions for which satisfying an-
swers also depend on extra-legal aspects, such as political feasibility and free riders-
 
Comments on the Commission Proposal for a Dublin IV Regulation COM(2016) 270”, October 2016, 
available at: <www.ecre.org/ecre-comments-on-commission-proposal-for-reform-of-the-dublin-system>.  
5
 For an overview of substantive rights under the 1951 refugee Status Convention and applicable hu-
man rights regimes, see: HATHAWAY, The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge, 2005. 
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problems, to name just a few.6 It will be impossible to be conclusive on the distribu-
tive and litigation potential of the proposed mechanisms in global refugee policy 
within the scope of this chapter; these are areas for future research. 
Neither is it the intention to conclusively clear the terminological fog hanging 
over some of the discussed concepts, such as solidarity, cooperation, responsibility- 
and burden-sharing, but also refugee protection or responsibility. Those terms some-
times have different meanings in different contexts or other branches of international 
or regional law. The lack of exact definitions adds to the already difficult identifica-
tion of normative content,7 but also makes the notions “attractively void of precise 
meaning”.8 Where there is need for clarity, I will justify the working definitions I 
adopt or let cited case-law speak for itself. 
In two short introductory sections I will first clarify for which refugee rights 
States bear responsibility (Section 1), and how this responsibility is traditionally at-
tributed to States on the basis of jurisdiction and how they try to avoid it (Section 2).  
Then I will explain which criteria there are to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction 
(Section 3), what alternative criteria the principles of cooperation and solidarity (Sec-
tion 4), and the Responsibility to Protect-doctrine (Section 5) could come up with, 
and what distributive potential these mechanisms might have among States with re-
gard to responsibilities for refugee protection. 
2. – Refugee Protection and State Responsibility 
Refugees are migrants, by definition. Access of migrants to the territory of a State 
and their residence traditionally are considered to fall under the national sovereignty 
of States. First bilateral agreements, and later human rights law have long since im-
posed restrictions on the absolute and discretionary meaning attached to this princi-
ple before.9 The concept of sovereignty now no longer only describes national States’ 
 
6
 See e.g.: BETTS, “Public Goods Theory and the Provision of Refugee Protection: The Role of the 
Joint-Product Model in Burden-Sharing Theory”, Journal of Refugee Studies, 2003, p. 274 ff.; NOLL, “Pris-
oners' Dilemma in Fortress Europe. On the Prospects of Burden Sharing in the European Union”, German 
Yearbook of International Law, 1997, p. 405 ff.; SUHRKE, cit. supra note 3. 
7
 INDER, “The Origins of ‘Burden Sharing’ in the Contemporary Refugee Protection Regime”, Inter-
national Journal of Refugee Law, 2017, p. 523 ff., pp. 528-530.   
8
 NOLL, “Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden-Sharing in the Asylum Field”, Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 2003, p. 236 ff., pp. 236-237.   
9
 HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 5, pp. 75-153. 
See also, Permanent Court of International Justice, France v. Great Britain (Nationality Decrees), 
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competence and powers, but also their legal responsibility under contemporary in-
ternational law.10  
States now undisputedly have a legal responsibility towards refugees: contempo-
rary international refugee law imposes obligations upon States to respect, secure and 
fulfil rights of refugees – besides additional regional commitments, such as under 
the European Union (‘EU’) asylum acquis. Some of those rights have the status of 
international customary law, and are specific to their status as migrant (most notably, 
the non-refoulement principle),11 or as human being (such as non-discrimination or 
the prohibition of inhumane or degrading treatment);12 others are treaty-based gen-
eral human rights or rights of a specific category of forcibly displaced persons,13 or 
established by case-law.14   
The – in this chapter further unspecified –15 totality of those refugee rights and 
corresponding State obligations towards refugees can be referred to as ‘refugee pro-
 
Advisory Opinion 7 February 1927, p. 24: “[…] in a matter which, like that of nationality, is not, in prin-
ciple, regulated by international law, the right of a State to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by 
obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States. In such a case, jurisdiction which, in prin-
ciple, belongs solely to the State, is limited by rules of international law.” 
10
 CHETAIL, “The transnational Movement of Persons under general international law- Mapping the 
customary law foundations of International Migration Law”, in CHETAIL and BAUDOZ (eds.), Research 
Handbook on International Law and Migration, Cheltenham, 2014, p. 1 ff., p. 32; CARLIER and SAROLEA, 
Droit des Étrangers, Bruxelles, 2016, pp. 75-78. 
11
 HURWITZ, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, Oxford, 2009, p. 204; 
CHETAIL, cit. supra note 10, pp. 27-72. 
12
 HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 5, pp. 160-170; Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights 
(OHCHR), CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, 1986. 
13
 E.g.: ‘Convention-refugees’, to whom the strict definition of Article 1(A) of the 1951 Refugee Status 
Convention applies, have, to the same level as nationals, civil status guarantees (Art. 12), access to work 
(Art. 23), travel documents (Art. 24) or social aid (Art. 28); HURWITZ, cit. supra note 11, pp. 173-222. 
14
 E.g.: access to an asylum procedure, recognized by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States, Case Judgement of 13 March 1997; 
see: HURWITZ, cit. supra note 11, p. 211. Or admission to the territory, see: HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 5, 
p. 301. 
15
 This chapter is not intended to enumerate all the different (categories of) rights that together make 
up ‘refugee protection’, nor to specify which legal category of ‘refugee’ (see supra note 1) is entitled to 
which rights under which subfield of international law, then to analyse which State might be responsible 
to ensure each right, etc. This chapter only wants to map some legal mechanisms for the distribution of 
State responsibility, then to evaluate what their potential might be for States’ refugee protection responsi-
bilities.      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 Ruben Wissing 
 
 
tection’. When respected and protected by the State, refugee protection can be qual-
ified as ‘effective’.16   
3. – Territorial Jurisdiction and Externalisation  
International refugee law determines protection status and rights. However, in-
ternational refugee law did not establish a specific inter-state mechanism to deter-
mine which state is responsible to uphold which share of global refugee protection 
(let alone how to hold it accountable).17 Such a legal mechanism with binding allo-
cation criteria could be instrumental to deal with the question of distribution of ref-
ugee protection obligations, and the actual refugees themselves, between States and 
avoid unjustifiable imbalances and inequalities. 
There is a clear distinction between two types of State responsibility distribution 
mechanisms. I have opted to call responsibility ‘allocation’, the legal mechanisms 
for sharing and distributing responsibilities between States on an a priori basis of 
binding criteria.  The other type I call responsibility ‘attribution’, to refer more gen-
erally to the judicial a posteriori correcting mechanisms for establishing responsibil-
ity for violations of individuals’ rights by applying legal criteria to connect law vio-
lations with a specific State.18 Attribution is restorative, allocation rather preventive.19 
The prime instrument of international refugee law, the 1951 Refugee Status Con-
vention, does not provide a specific allocation criterion for state responsibility, and 
initiatives taken under United Nations (‘UN’) auspices or at regional level to estab-
lish a (re)distribution mechanism have so far failed to deliver,20 notwithstanding the 
 
16
 HURWITZ, cit. supra note 11, pp. 52-56 and 214. 
17
 WALL, “A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for Refugee Responsibility 
Sharing Fulfil the Promise of the 1967 Protocol?”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2017, p. 201 ff., 
p. 203; HATHAWAY and NEVE, “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Col-
lectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1997, p. 115 ff., p. 141; 
TENDAYI ACHIUME, “Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect Refugees”, Minnesota Law 
Review, 2015, p. 687 ff., pp. 690-691; MCADAM and DOWD, cit. supra not 4, p. 865. 
18
 While the terminological distinction is my own, I find inspiration for the conceptual difference in 
CHRISTENSON, “The Doctrine of Attribution in State Responsibility”, in RICHARD (ed.), International Law 
of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 1983, p. 321 ff. 
19
 The distinction is not necessarily clear cut: a practice of inter-state allocation can find its legal basis 
in an a posteriori dispute over violation of rights, initiated by an individual (e.g. the non-discretionary 
application of the sovereignty clause in the Dublin II-regulation found its origin in the European Court of 
Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) MSS-case). 
20
 See supra note 4. 
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repeated recognition of the need for binding engagements.21  This flaw exacerbates 
‘overburdening’ of certain countries, mostly in developing regions of origin, while 
others stay unaffected and can basically keep their borders closed to refugees.22  
To fill this hiatus in international refugee law, we thus have to fall back to general 
international law. More exactly, I decided to look at international case-law for solu-
tions, one of jurisprudence’s raisons d’être precisely being the attribution of respon-
sibility.  
In the absence of binding inter-state allocation criteria in refugee law, refugees 
generally have to undertake individual judicial action to stand up for their protection 
rights. Since no specific international court has the competence at supranational level 
to deal with claims against States for violations of the international refugee law itself, 
individuals generally bring them before international or regional human right courts 
or committees and relate to violations of parallel human rights provisions.  To attrib-
ute responsibility for the violation of an individual’s human rights to a specific State, 
human rights treaties determine the State’s exercise of jurisdiction as the defining 
criterion.23 Classic sovereignty doctrine establishes jurisdiction on a territorial basis: 
the primary State responsible for securing someone’s human rights is the territorial 
State on which he or she is present.24 International and European jurisprudence, how-
ever, have gradually applied a broader interpretation of State jurisdiction by ac-
knowledging its exercise beyond its territory, because of the negative consequences 
of a purely territorial interpretation of jurisdiction.    
A good illustration of such negative effects are the EU ‘externalisation’ policies.25  
‘Externalisation’ is the term broadly used for the amalgam of policy measures, 
practices and actions, legal provisions and political agreements in migration policies 
employed by national governments and supranational organisations, such as the EU, 
 
21
 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/RES/71/1, para 68, and Annex 1 
(Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework), para 1; WALL, cit. supra note 17 pp. 210-214. 
22
 For figures, see supra note 2. 
23
 Article 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 2 Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and Article 1 ECHR. 
24
 CHETAIL, cit. supra note. 10, pp. 27-28; CARLIER and SAROLEA, cit. supra note 10, pp. 63-64; In 
refugee law this same idea – discretionary jurisdiction of the territorial state to grant asylum – is expressed 
in the concept of ‘territorial asylum’ (UNGA, 1967, Resolution 2312, Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 
art. 3). 
25
 Also called ‘politics of non-entrée’. See: GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, “Non-Re-
foulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2015, p. 235 
ff., p. 241. 
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intended to avoid migrants coming under their jurisdiction in order to circumvent 
responsibility for refugee protection and regional and national judicial scrutiny – ba-
sically the outsourcing of border management to third States, by exporting it under 
their territorial jurisdiction.26 Generally the term is used for EU’s external policies:27 
carriers sanctions, strengthened external border controls in the Mediterranean, the 
deal with Turkey to keep refugees from onward movement,28 agreements with Libya 
or Niger to intercept and return migrants, etc.29 But also mutual deterrence policies 
between EU Member States themselves, although less commonly labelled as such, 
are good examples of ‘externalisation’: the strict application of Dublin III-regulation, 
reluctance to fully implement the relocation mechanisms, the reintroduction of inter-
nal border controls.  
Externalisation causes burden-shifting, unequal distribution of refugees and pro-
tection responsibility, and a globally shrinking protection space for those in need of 
and entitled to international protection. 30 When refugees are constrained to countries 
of first asylum in the Global South, away from the common EU protection regime, 
their access to effective protection is endangered, and international (and European) 
refugee and human rights standards are more likely to be infringed. Implementing 
policies that physically prevent migrants from entering the EU or a specific member 
 
26
 RODIER, “Analysis of the External Dimension of the European Union's Asylum and Immigration 
Policies - Summary and Recommendations for the European Parliament”, European Parliament, 
DT\619330EN.doc (2006), p. 8; GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 25, pp. 244 and 
249.  For a distinction between the external dimension and externalisation based on the effectiveness of 
control by the externalising State or need for implementation by the third State, see MC NAMARA, “Member 
State Responsibility for Migration Control within Third States – Externalisation Revisited”, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 2013, p. 319 ff., pp. 326-328.  
27
 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway distinguish between a first generation of ‘non-entrée’ measures 
(visa controls, carrier sanctions, creation of ‘international zones’ and deterrence on the high seas), and 
seven forms of second generation cooperation-based policies. See GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, 
cit. supra note 25, pp. 244-256. 
28
 European Council, EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, available at: <www.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement> (“Turkey will take any necessary 
measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU”). 
29
 For examples and references of externalisation measures, see i.a.: GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and TAN, 
“The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy”, Journal on Migra-
tion and Human Security, 2017, p. 28 ff. 
30
 I use the term ‘protection space’ to refer to the global complex composed of different territories, 
policies and practices that, separately or taken together, guarantee refugee protection in conformity with 
international (and regional) law. When such protection is accessible for refugees, it can be called ‘effec-
tive’. 
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State immobilises refugees in substandard legal and material conditions,31 including 
within the EU itself.32  Strict EU external border policies have also made irregular 
border-crossings more difficult and deadly, leading to increased reliance on smug-
gling networks.33 Externalisation further causes spill-over effects in many transit 
countries with already restricted refugee protection regimes, as it does not incentiv-
izes them to fully implement the international refugee and human rights law them-
selves. Rather refugee hosting countries start copying externalisation practices, and 
might back down from existing non-refoulement guarantees or make them condi-
tional upon stronger responsibility-sharing commitments by countries in the Global 
North.34  
Could States that undertake externalisations practices and policies be held re-
sponsible for violations of international refugee or human rights law outside their 
own territory? Before focussing on alternatives to the jurisdiction criterion, I will 
first analyse under which conditions jurisdiction can be engaged extraterritorially.   
4. – First Mechanism: Attribution on the Basis of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction 
States have been held responsible for practices outside of their territorial borders 
that affected persons who were considered to fall under their jurisdiction.  This Sec-
tion first analyses the scope and interpretation given to extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
European and international case-law. Than it will assess the potential of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction for responsibility allocation to States for acts that affect refugee 
rights beyond its borders and executed by others than its own agents. 
 
31
 Such as collective detention camps, lack of asylum processing and reception, legal uncertainty and 
precarious protection status, limited to no access to work, education, integration opportunities or material 
support. 
32
 E.g. reception conditions on the Greek islands. See: Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights 
of the Council of Europe Dunja Mijatovi following her Visit to Greece from 25 to 29 June 2018, available 
at: <www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/greece-should-safeguard-social-rights-for-all-and-improve-the-
reception-and-integration-of-migrants>. 
33
 For data on deaths at sea and human smuggling, see International Organisation for Migration’s da-
tabase, available at <missingmigrants.iom.int/> and <migrationdataportal.org/themes/smuggling-mi-
grants>; COSTELLO, cit. supra note 4, p. 5. 
34
 HURWITZ, cit. supra note 11, pp. 165-176; CHIMNI “Aid, Relief, and Containment: The First Asylum 
Country and Beyond”, International Migration, 2002, p. 75 ff., pp. 83-84; GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, Access 
to Asylum, Aarhus, 2009, pp. 265-266. 
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4.1. – European Case-law: Control, Authority, Effect 
In the context of EU Member States’ migration policies, regional courts have 
played a central role in interpreting the scope of State jurisdiction, and thus setting 
out the extent of States’ responsibility for human rights and refugee protection. To 
determine States’ extraterritorial jurisdiction, the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) in particular has developed extensive case-law on the application of Ar-
ticle 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’): “The High Con-
tracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms defined in Section I of this Convention.” 
Although, in the 2001 Bankovi case, the Court declared sovereign territorial ju-
risdiction to be the general rule, accepting non-territorial based jurisdiction “only in 
exceptional cases” demanding special justification,35 it had already adopted in the 
1997 Loizidou case that “under its established case-law the concept of jurisdiction 
under Article 1 […] is not restricted to the national territory […] the responsibility 
of Contracting States can be involved by acts and omissions of their authorities which 
produce effects outside their own territory.”36  
The Court established extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases in which the State had 
an overall control over a part of the territory beyond its borders as a consequence of 
military action, but also when State authorities have control over the person affected. 
The Court explicits in its 2005 Öcalan and Issa judgements, that a State can exercise 
jurisdiction over persons outside of its territory, whenever that State has authority or 
effective control over them, even temporarily or de facto.37  In Al-Skeini, the Court 
clarifies: “What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control 
over the person in question.”38  
The Court specifies that “[i]n each case, the question whether exceptional cir-
cumstances exist which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was 
exercising jurisdiction extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the 
 
35
 European Court of Human Rights, Bankovi and Others v. Belgium and Others, Application No. 
52207/99, Decision (Grand Chamber) of 12 December 2001, para. 67. 
36
 Id., Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 153818/89 Judgment (merits) of 18 December 1996, para. 
52. 
37
 Id., Issa v. Turkey, Application No. 31821/96, Judgment of 16 November 2005, para. 74; Id., Öcalan 
v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 12 May 2005, para. 91. 
38
 Id., Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, Judgment (Grand Cham-
ber) of 7 July 2011, para. 136. 
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particular facts.”39 Certain activities of EU State’s agents outside their national terri-
tory (under EU’s externalisation policy), constitute an effective control or power 
over a person extraterritorially, and thus allocate responsibility with that State.40  
The Court also explicitly applied this line of reasoning in specific migration sit-
uations at and beyond State borders, where refugee rights such as the prohibition of 
refoulement or the right to seek asylum were at stake. The Court finds that a state 
exercises jurisdiction in international zones at airports,41 at sea ports,42 on airplanes it 
refuses to land and at checkpoints outside its territory.43 Most notoriously, in the Hirsi 
Jamaa case, concerning the interception of migrants on the high seas, the Court es-
tablishes that State action “the effect of which is to prevent non-nationals from reach-
ing the borders of the State or even to push them back to another State”, constitutes 
an extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.44  To attribute State responsibility for sit-
uations aboard ships, the findings in the Hirsi judgement were based on the fact that 
ship and crew were de facto as well as de iure under the control of the (Italian) State, 
since it sailed under its flag.45 In its earlier Medvedyev judgement, it also assumed 
(French) jurisdiction on the basis of mere de facto control of the crew, superseding 
the flag state criterion.46  
At yet, doctrine generally identifies two models for attributing extraterritorial ju-
risdiction in European case-law, both based on effective control. First, a spatial 
model, based on the exercise by a State, through its agents, of overall control or 
authority over (a part of) a territory beyond its own borders. Second, a personal 
model based on effective control and physical power over the alleged victims.47 Both 
 
39
 Ibid., para. 132. 
40
 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 25, p. 263. 
41
 European Court of Human Rights, Amuur v. France, Application No. 19776/92, Judgment of 25 
June 1996. 
42
 Id., Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Application No. 16643/09, Judgment of 21 October 
2014. 
43
 Id., East African Asians (British protected persons) v. the United Kingdom, Application Nos. 
4715/70, 4783/71 and 4827/71, Judgment of 6 March 1978. 
44
 Id., Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 23 
February 2012, paras. 78 and 180. 
45
 Ibid., paras. 70-75. 
46
 Id., Medvedyev and Others v. France, Application No. 3394/03, Judgment of 29 March 2010, para. 
66-67 
47
 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway distinguish a third model whereby extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
established on the basis of exercising ‘public powers’ abroad, namely when, as identified in Al-Skeini, “in 
accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of the Contracting State carry out executive 
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models concern acts exercised extraterritorially by organs or agents of the external-
ising State.  
4.2. – International Law and Decisions: Control, Relationship, Effect 
UN human rights bodies also have elaborated extraterritorial jurisdiction criteria 
for international law.  
The Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) clarifies the scope of the obligation un-
der Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’) to “respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant” in its General Com-
ment No. 31. It ascertains State jurisdiction “to anyone within the power or effective 
control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party 
[…], regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control was 
obtained”.48  
The HRC developed a consistent practice since the 1981 Lopez Burgos case, in 
which it finds the Covenant applicable and the State responsible for the actions of its 
agents “on the territory of another State, whether with the acquiescence of the Gov-
ernment of that State or in opposition to it”.49  Extraterritorial jurisdiction for human 
right violations does not vaporise on account of complicity of the territorial State.   
 
or judicial functions on the territory of another State” (para. 135). See: GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and 
HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 25, pp. 266-272. I tend to see in it rather a variation of the other two ‘control’-
models. The existence of an agreement or other legal basis or not, does not appear, to me, to be in itself the 
constitutive element for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Rather it is an element of proof to indicate that control, 
power or authority might have been exercised extraterritorially. From the existence and content of such an 
agreement one might infer the personal or territorial control State agents were entitled to exercise on the 
territory of the third State, but not that they have effectively done so, nor that it is a necessary condition to 
do so. The two additional conditions identified by the authors in order for this proposed model to apply – 
in particular “the breach of human rights resulting from the exercise of public powers must be attributable 
to the extraterritorially acting state, rather than to the territorial state” –, has the same effect as sorting it as 
a variation of the other models. Their conclusion seems to support my suggestion: “Where there is an 
agreement to deploy liaison officers or provide other forms of support that in substance result in the exer-
cise of effective control by the sponsoring state, jurisdiction—and hence liability—is established.” (empha-
sis added) 
48
 United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 
(2004), para. 10. 
49
 Id., Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 
88 (1984), para. 12.3 
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In the same case, the Committee also determines that jurisdiction (under the Op-
tional Protocol) does not refer “to the place where the violation occurred, but rather 
to the relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a violation of 
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred.”50 The relevance 
of the ‘State-individual relationship in relation to the violation’ leaves room for ac-
cepting State jurisdiction even beyond violations committed directly by it agents 
abroad – e.g. for human rights violations of refugees in a transit country due to poli-
cies exactly intended to have a cross-border impact on that population. 
In its 2003 concluding observations on Israel, the HRC further clarified the rela-
tion between the conduct of the State and the violation, regardless of the range of 
control: "the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the 
Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State party's authorities or agents in those 
territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall 
within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public inter-
national law" [sic].51  
The Committee Against Torture (‘CAT’), in its General Comment on Article 2 of 
the Convention against Torture, determines that “the concept of ‘any territory under 
its jurisdiction’ […] must be applied to protect any person, citizen or non-citizen with-
out discrimination subject to the de jure or de facto control of the State party”.52 In its 
2008 Marine I decision, on the interception of migrants at sea by Spanish State agents 
and their continuous detention in Mauritania, the CAT accepted that a State’s jurisdic-
tion applied “to any territory in which it exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or 
in part, de jure or de facto effective control, in accordance with international law.”53  
The International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has endorsed the position of the UN 
bodies. In its 2004 advisory opinion Construction of a Wall, the Court refers to the 
“constant practice of the Human Rights Committee” since the Lopez Burgos case 
and its concluding observations on Israel, as well as to the original inspiration of the 
ICCPR drafters in 1955:  
 
50
 Ibid., para. 12.2. 
51
 Id., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C0/78/1SR (2003), para. 11. 
52
 United Nations Committee Against Torture (UNCAT), General Comment No. 2, Implementation of 
Article 2 by States parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008), para. 7. 
53
 Id., J.H.A. v. Spain, Judgments, Decision of 10 November 2008, para. 8.1.  
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“The travaux préparatoires of the Covenant confirm the Committee's interpretation of 
Article 2 of that instrument. These show that, in adopting the wording chosen, the drafters 
of the Covenant did not intend to allow States to escape from their obligations when they 
exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory.”54 
In conclusion, also international law reflects in judicial and quasi-judicial deci-
sions the two models for establishing jurisdiction that was identified within the EC-
tHR case-law: the spatial, based on territorial control, and the personal, based on 
control over the individual. It further adds some extra qualifying elements: the irrel-
evance of the complicity or agreement of the territorial state, and the relevance of 
the state-individual relation for establishing the rights violation.    
4.3. – Potential of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for Refugee Protection: 
Impact, Instructions, Assistance  
The two control-based models for identifying extraterritorial jurisdiction (spatial 
and personal) do not suffice, however, to attribute responsibility for more indirect 
externalisation practices – let alone for an equitable allocation of responsibility for 
refugee protection in general, independent from a State’s involvement in externali-
sation or not. What about violations that are not exercised by agents of the external-
ising State, but implemented in and by third countries themselves? It feels legally 
logical that, irrespective of the question whether or not spatial or personal extraterri-
torial jurisdiction can be established, a State should respect and ensure human rights 
to the extent that it reasonably can: jurisdiction would thus be established by the 
State’s obligation of due diligence.55 
Doctrine seems to be identifying a third way of establishing extraterritorial juris-
diction.56  In a 2018 draft for a new General Comment on the right to life, the HRC 
includes under persons over whom a state exercises power or effective control, those 
“located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, whose right to life 
 
54
 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 109-110.  
55
 MILANOVIC, The Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties : law, principles, and policy, 
Oxford, 2011, p. 209-210. 
56
 MOGSTER, “Towards Universality: Activities Impacting the Enjoyment of the Right to Life and the 
Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR”, EJILtalk, 27 November 2018, available at < 
www.ejiltalk.org/towards-universality-activities-impacting-the-enjoyment-of-the-right-to-life-and-the-ex-
traterritorial-application-of-the-iccpr>;  GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, cit. supra note 25, p. 268. 
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is nonetheless impacted by its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably 
foreseeable manner.”57 Even though the HRC considers it as a form of exercise of 
power or control by the State, ‘direct and reasonably foreseeable impact’ clearly adds 
a new layer to the already accepted criteria to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction.   
The new model made explicit here reflects the range of control that State juris-
diction can entail, beside, or on top of, the forms of control acknowledged under the 
spatial and personal models.  What is new, and relevant for evaluating external mi-
gration policies, is the shift in focus from the link of the responsible State with the 
victim (effective control under the personal model) to the link with (acts of) the per-
petrator (the impact model). This shift overcomes the distinction between violations 
committed by State agents beyond their State’s borders, and those committed by non-
agents or third State officials acting under (another) State’s direction or control.  
This broadening application of the extraterritorial jurisdiction, beyond the State’s 
control as envisaged by the established models, is also made explicit in the Draft 
articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, of the Interna-
tional Law Commission (‘ILC’). Article 8 reads: “The conduct of a person or group 
of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person 
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.” 58   
Attribution of responsibility for giving instructions to persons that are not agents 
of the instructing State goes beyond the classical attribution to State agents. In its 
Commentary to the Draft Articles, the ILC points to the importance of “the existence 
of a real link between the person or group performing the act and the State machin-
ery.”59 In order to qualify this ‘link’ more precisely, the ILC refers to the ICJ judge-
ment in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua), where State responsibility 
 
57
 UNHRC, (Advance unedited version) General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018), para. 
63 (emphasis added). 
58
 ILC, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/56/10 
(2001), Art. 8 (emphasis added).  The Articles have repeatedly been commended and their importance 
acknowledged by the UN General Assembly. An overview of those Resolutions is available at: <le-
gal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_6.shtml>.  
59
 ILC, “Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commen-
taries”, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 31 ff., Art. 8, Com-
mentary (1). 
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was attributed for the employment of auxiliaries:60  
“Each case will depend on its own facts, in particular those concerning the relationship 
between the instructions given or the direction or control exercised and the specific conduct 
complained of. […] the instructions, direction or control must relate to the conduct which is 
said to have amounted to an internationally wrongful act.” 61  
While discarding responsibility attribution for conduct of persons that clearly 
goes beyond lawful instructions of the State, the ILC however accepts responsibility 
in case “particular instructions may have been ignored”.62 The ICJ in its 2005 Armed 
Activities (DRC v. Uganda) judgement also considered it irrelevant whether auxilia-
ries (UDFP soldiers) “acted contrary to instructions given or exceeded their author-
ity” “for their attribution of their conduct” on the territory of their own State (Congo) 
to an external State (Uganda).63  
Also the HRC further qualifies the extraterritorial impact on third State perpetra-
tors of human rights violations, referring in its draft General Comment No. 36 to 
Article 16 of the ILC Draft Articles, by reminding States that they also have “obli-
gations under international law not to aid or assist activities undertaken by other 
States and non-State actors that violate the right to life”.64   
From this perspective, it can be concluded that the impact-model could find a 
potential application as an attribution mechanism for refugee protection responsibil-
ity. Refugee rights violations conducted on the territory of a third State, but instructed 
or directed by a ‘sponsoring State’ or under the direct and foreseeable impact of its 
policies intended at externalising its refugee protection responsibilities, can be at-
tributed to that instructing State which thus bears responsibility for it.65 In this re-
spect, an interesting judgement to watch out for is the M.N. v. Belgium case pending 
before the ECtHR Grand Chamber.66 The Court might need to interpret the scope of 
 
60
 International Court of Justice, Nicaragua v. United States of America (Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua), Judgement (merits) of 27 June 1986, para. 86 (emphasis added). 
61
 See supra note 58, Art. 8, Commentary (7) (emphasis added). 
62
 Ibid., Art. 8, Commentary (8). 
63
 International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168 ff., para. 214. 
64
 See supra note 57. 
65
 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN and HATHAWAY, cit. supra note. 25, p. 268. 
66
 European Court Of Human Rights, M.N. and Others v. Belgium, Application no. 3599/18; ECtHR, 
“Grand Chamber to examine case concerning consular authorities’ refusal to grant humanitarian visas re-
quested by Syrian nationals”, 26 November 2018, ECHR 402 (2018), available at: <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-
press?i=003-5127469-6327387>.  
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the impact-model when it will have to judge if the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a 
the State (Belgium) is engaged by refusing a visa to a refugee in a country of first 
asylum (Lebanon), and if by consequence it could be held responsible for eventual 
violations of the refugee’s fundamental rights in that third country. 
The scope of application of the HRC impact-model seems so far limited to right 
to life violations – and the threshold as well as qualification (‘direct and reasonably 
foreseeable’) will need further interpretation. Still, refugee lives are endangered and 
deprived due to the border controls and detention and refoulement practices in coun-
tries of transit or first asylum. Even in situations where agents of an EU Member 
State have not been directly engaged, one could soundly argue that its externalisation 
policies and cooperation with the territorial State have a direct and foreseeable im-
pact on refugees’ right to life, irrespective of the exact degree of control.   
4.4. – Beyond Jurisdiction: Alternative Allocation Mechanisms in 
International (Case) Law 
The jurisprudence referred to so far is mainly case-law attributing responsibility 
(a posteriori) to a State for violations of international law, by determining if the vi-
olation happened under its jurisdiction, be it territorial or extraterritorial. Jurisdiction 
simply attaches legal consequences to acts or omissions of a State on an objective 
basis (control, impact). This approach, however, does not suffice to structurally al-
locate (a priori) responsibility among States for global refugee protection in an eq-
uitable manner.  
Since States hardly allocate on a voluntary basis, a responsibility criterion is 
sought for that establishes a positive obligation on States to guarantee quality and 
availability of international protection also for refugees who find themselves beyond 
their jurisdiction.67   
Can international jurisprudence teach us something about structural inter-state 
responsibility allocation beyond their respective jurisdictions? The answer to that 
question might find in global refugee protection one of its most useful practical ap-
plications. I will map some of the lines of reasoning in international case-law, and 
tentatively hint at their potential for a more equal and fair distribution of responsi-
 
67
 For the definition of ‘quality of protection’, I refer to the use of the term by Gammeltoft-Hansen: 
“the certainty, scope and level of rights afforded to refugees”. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, cit. supra note 34, 
p. 62-63. 
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bilities for refugee protection.  First, I enquire into the obvious legal basis in inter-
national law for responsibility-sharing, the principles of international cooperation 
and solidarity (Section 5). Then, I evaluate a concept from international humanitarian 
law, the Responsibility to Protect-doctrine (Section 6). 
5. – Second Mechanism:  Allocation on the Basis of the Principles of 
Cooperation and Solidarity  
After first explaining what the central concepts of solidarity, cooperation and re-
sponsibility-sharing mean under general international law, this Section explores 
whether and how those principles have been operationalised in international refugee 
law and in international human rights law, to conclude with a glimpse at a regional 
implementation, in the EU migration policy. 
5.1. – International Law Concepts 
Solidarity, cooperation, burden- and responsibility-sharing are confusingly used 
almost as synonyms in refugee studies.68  This chapter does not intend to settle the 
issue, but approaches it with pragmatism. The following working definitions are 
based on doctrine and legal sources commonly referred to in the field of international 
refugee law, but demand a pragmatic use due to unavoidable overlap and incoher-
ence. 
International cooperation is an overarching objective of the UN, entailing the le-
gal duty for States to take joint and separate action in areas where there are shared 
interests and mutual benefits.69 The UN Charter mentions it as one of the UN’s prin-
cipal purposes “in solving international problems of […] humanitarian character, and 
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights”.70 The principle itself does 
not specify the specific contribution due by States to comply with this duty, nor its 
form or content.  
The UN General Assembly, in its Millennium Declaration, further considers 
“certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-
first century”, i.a.: “Solidarity. Global challenges must be managed in a way that 
distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity 
 
68
 INDER, cit. supra note 7, p. 528. 
69
 TÜRK and GARLICK, cit. supra note 3, p.658-660. 
70
 Art. 1(3) UN Charter. 
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and social justice. Those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those 
who benefit most.”, and: “Shared responsibility. Responsibility for managing world-
wide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and 
security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised 
multilaterally. […]”71 
Solidarity is a fundamental value that acknowledges a shared interest in the need 
for support between States in order to lighten the unequal distribution of burdens and 
costs that are necessary to satisfactorily implement humanitarian principles.72 It is a 
political principle that is value driven (equity, fairness), has legal quality, and is con-
text-sensitive for its implementation. 73  While the duty of cooperation is not defined 
by its outcome, solidarity is, in demanding an equitable, fairer sharing of burdens – 
still that does not yet make it sufficiently precise to substantiate specific legal obli-
gation for States.74  
Burden- and/or responsibility-sharing reflect a more concrete goal for interna-
tional cooperation, and an intended outcome of solidarity,75 namely the distribution 
of costs and benefits between States.76 In refugee policy it includes engagements for 
an equitable distribution of the consequences of refugee hosting and protection. The 
term ‘burden’ could cover all kinds of specific commitments and efforts a certain 
obligation entails for a State. It is widely understood to refer to the rather negative 
aspect of ‘costs’ of refugee protection for a State. Hence the use of the more neutral 
term ‘responsibility-sharing’, which also refers to a broader set of inter-state assis-
tance measures, such as resettlement of refugees or assistance in migration manage-
ment, besides simple cost-sharing.77  
 
71
 United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES/A/55/2, 18 September 2000, para. 6. 
72
 TURK and GARLICK, cit. supra note 3,  pp. 661-663.  
73
 KOTZUR, “Solidarity as a Legal Concept”, in GRIMMEL and MY GIANG (eds.), Solidarity in the Eu-
ropean Union, Hamburg, 2017, p. 36 ff., pp. 39-40. 
74
 MORENO-LAX, “Solidarity’s reach: Meaning, dimensions and implications for EU (external) asylum 
policy”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2017, p. 740 ff., pp. 743 and 749. For an 
extended analysis of the concept of solidarity in refugee and EU law, see: WAGNER et. al. , cit. supra note 
2. 
75
 MORENO-LAX, cit. supra note 74, p. 749. 
76
 BETTS, COSTELLO, ZAUN, “A Fair Share: Refugees and Responsibility-Sharing”, Delmi-report 
Stockholm, 2017, pp. 19-22. 
77
 TURK and GARLICK, cit. supra note 3, pp.  663-665; HATHAWAY and NEVE, cit. supra note 17, p. 
201-209.  
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The principles of international cooperation and solidarity are key to dealing with 
transnational issues under international law and enshrined in numerous soft-law doc-
uments, including Resolutions of the General Assembly.78 The instruments are not 
operationalised in directly enforceable responsibility-distributing mechanisms or 
sufficiently specific provisions: burden-sharing commitments tend to be limited to 
voluntary contributions or ad hoc solutions, and they lack State practice to be con-
sidered international customary law. International solidarity and cooperation, and re-
sponsibility-sharing solutions are consequently fraught with collective-action and 
free-rider problems.79 
5.2. – Responsibility-sharing in International Refugee Law 
Also more specifically in international refugee law itself, references to the duty 
to cooperate, inspired by the principle of solidarity, and engagements to share bur-
dens and responsibilities are made repeatedly, though also in soft-law instruments 
that lack enforceable operationalisation. 
The Preamble of the 1951 Refugee Status Convention endorses cooperation and 
burden-sharing:  
“Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain coun-
tries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized 
the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-
operation,”  
The objective of the Convention itself, finding a ‘satisfactory solution’ for the 
global issue of refugee protection, is directly attached to the States’ duty to cooper-
ate. From the Travaux Préparatoires to the Convention, it becomes clear that with 
“the principle of burden-sharing […] not only international cooperation in the field 
of protection but also in the field of assistance, help for States on which the refugee 
problem places too heavy a burden was meant”.80 The Final Act of the Conference 
 
78
 E.g. Declaration on the Right to Development, UN Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986), Annex, Arts. 3 and 
6; Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, UN Doc. A/RES/59/193 (2004), para. 4 
(f). 
79
 WALL, cit. supra note 17, p. 207-209; TENDAYI ACHIUME, cit. supra note 17, p. 703; see supra note 
6. 
80
 UNHCR, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux préparatoires analysed with a Commentary 
by Dr. Paul Weis, 1990, p. 32. 
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adopting the Convention additionally recommends “that these refugees may find asy-
lum and the possibility of resettlement”.81 However, neither the Convention nor the 
interpretative texts, tell how burden-sharing should exactly come about or go that far 
as to establish a concrete responsibility allocation mechanism. 
Interestingly, Article 38 of the Convention appoints the ICJ as the forum litis to 
settle inter-state disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Conven-
tion, in case they cannot be settled by other means. A dispute between States about 
who should guarantee certain rights under the Convention in a situation of overbur-
dening – refering to the Preamble’s explicit call for cooperative solutions –, could 
thus theoretically be brought before the ICJ under this provision. In essence this con-
stitutes a question of responsibility-sharing among States.82  There is no precedent of 
the ICJ case-law on the application of the 1951 Convention.83 However, an advisory 
opinion of the ICJ could give an authoritative interpretation of the restrictions on 
States’ discretion in border and migration control imposed by minimum standards 
for Convention refugees. This would essentially entail a practical implementation of 
burden-sharing obligations between States. Ideally the ICJ would formulate global 
responsibility allocation criteria, in case of overburdening, or even more structurally. 
Numerous UN texts further recall the cooperation and responsibility-sharing 
principles explicitly in the context of refugee protection, such as the General Assem-
bly’s Declaration on Territorial Asylum, the World Summit Outcome or the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development.84 
The most concrete operationalisation of cooperation and responsibility-sharing  
in international refugee law is the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), which includes to “assume the functions of […] seeking 
 
81
 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and State-
less Persons, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1 (1951), para. IV(D). 
82
 SKORDAS, “The Missing Link in Migration Governance: An Advisory Opinion by the International 
Court of Justice”, 2018, EJILtalk, available at: <www.ejiltalk.org/the-missing-link-in-migration-govern-
ance-an-advisory-opinion-by-the-international-court-of-justice/>. 
83
 In the 1951 Haya de la Torre case, the ICJ did call on state parties to “find a practical and satisfactory 
solution by seeking guidance from considerations of courtesy and good neighbourliness” (Colombia v. 
Peru (Haya de la Torre Case), Judgment of 13 June 1951, last para. before dictum). This case concerned a 
dispute on consular asylum between the State of origin and the asylum granting State, however.  
84
 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, UN Doc. A/RES/2312 (XXII) (1967), Art. 2; World Summit 
Outcome, A/RES/60/1 (2005), para. 133; Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable De-
velopment A/RES/70/1 (2015), para. 29. 
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permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting governments”, to “en-
gage in such additional activities, including repatriation and resettlement, as the Gen-
eral Assembly may determine”, and to “administer any funds” and “distribute them 
among the private and, as appropriate, public agencies which he seems best qualified 
to administer such assistance”.85 Treaty States have the legal obligation to cooperate 
with UNHCR “in the exercise of its functions” on the basis of Article 35 of the 1951 
Convention, and are called for voluntary financial contributions to the agency.86 Nev-
ertheless States’ effective contributions for structural or emergency responsibility-
sharing remain voluntary and funding is increasingly earmarked for internal migra-
tion policy preferences rather than in order to share responsibilities more equitably.87 
And even though the UNHCR Executive Committee (‘EXCOM’) has called numer-
ous times for better cooperation and more responsibility-sharing,88 a legally binding 
mechanism did not come about. 
UNHCR’s 2003 Agenda for Protection,89 established the ‘Convention Plus’-ap-
proach to “focus on those issues and activities that would benefit from multilateral 
commitment and cooperation”, and one of the goals of its Programme of Action was 
“sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and building capacities to re-
ceive and protect refugees”. It was endorsed by the General Assembly,90 but has also 
failed to bring about binding agreements.91  
Finally, the 2016 New York Declaration of the General Assembly, and the 2018 
Global Compact on Refugees (‘GCR’) are the most recent global initiatives “to pro-
vide a basis for predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing among 
 
85
 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees, UN Doc. 
A/RES/428(V) (1950), Annex, paras. 1, 9 and 10. 
86
 Ibid., para. 20. 
87
 BETTS, cit. supra note 6, pp. 288-292. In 2018, only 11% of UNHCR budget was funded by unear-
marked contributions (while 43% was not funded at all). See: UNHCR, Global Funding Overview, 31 
December 2018,  available at: <reporting.unhcr.org/financial#tabs-financial-contributions>.  
88
 E.g.: EXCOM, Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx No. 22 (XXXII) 
(1981); International Solidarity and Refugee Protection No. 52 (XXXIX) (1988); Conclusion on Interna-
tional Protection No. 89 (LI) (2000); Conclusion of the Executive Committee on international cooperation 
from a protection and solutions perspective No. 112 (LXVII) (2016). 
89
 UNHCR, Agenda for Protection, UN Doc. A/AC.96/965/Add.1 (2002). Third edition, October 2003, 
available at: <www.refworld.org/docid/4714a1bf2.html>. 
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 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Doc. RES/57/187 (2002), para. 
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91
 UNHCR, Progress Report: Convention Plus, UN Doc. FORUM/2005/6 (2005), paras. 10, 11, 13 and 
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all United Nations Member States”.92 The first text is a “political declaration” States 
commit to implement,93 the second is explicitly “non-political in nature” and “not 
legally binding”; 94 together they establish a Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework (‘CRRF’). 
Both texts have added a lot to the conceptualisation and some institutionalisation 
of the responsibility-sharing issue. Nevertheless, they have not yet led to more con-
crete binding commitments by States neither. 
Set up “to operationalize the principles of burden- and responsibility-sharing”, to 
“ease pressures on host countries” and “expand access to third country solutions”,95 
the GCR subscribes to an approach of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities 
(and respective capabilities)’ (‘CBDR(RC)’):96  
“To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more equitable 
sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, 
while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources 
among States.”97 
This idea is reflected in the mechanism for responsibility-sharing that is estab-
lished. The CRRF is conceptualized “for each situation involving large movements 
of refugees”,98 and operationalised under the GCR by the creation of two fora for 
cooperation: the quadrennial Global Refugee Forum where States will be called to 
“to announce concrete pledges and contributions towards the objectives of the global 
compact”;99 and context-specific Support Platforms, which host countries could ac-
tivate in case they lack the response capacity to deal with large-scale, complex or 
protracted refugee situations.100  
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 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II Global Compact on Refugees 
(GCR), UN Doc. A/73/12 (Part II) (2018), para. 3. 
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 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, UN Doc. A/RES/71/1 (2016), para. 1 and Annex, 
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 GCR, paras. 4 and 5. 
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 Ibid., paras. 5 and 7. 
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 DOWD and MCADAM, “International Cooperation And Responsibility Sharing To Combat Climate 
Change: Lessons For International Refugee Law”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2017, p. 180 
ff., pp. 197-198; HATHAWAY and NEVE, cit. supra note 17, pp. 201-209. 
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Both the New York Declaration and the GCR give a very holistic overview of 
“tools to operationalise burden- and responsibility-sharing”,101 including, besides the 
more traditional support through financing or resettlement, assistance for humanitar-
ian relief, supporting host communities, tackling root causes of forced displacement, 
ensuring sustainable return, and offering complementary pathways for humanitarian 
admission.102 
While the Compact and the Framework might potentially evolve into the large-
scale structural responsibility allocation mechanism this chapter tries to identify, 
they so far remain of a very non-committal nature. Responsibility-sharing advance-
ments continue to depend entirely on voluntary contributions and on the activation 
of an emergency mechanism by hosting States that might not have an interest in 
doing so – because the label ‘refugee’ crisis also entails a broad range of protection 
obligations under international law. 
5.3. – Responsibility-sharing in Human Rights Law 
In the search for mechanisms of responsibility allocation, it is useful to check if 
principles of international cooperation and solidarity are better implemented and en-
forceable in other branches of international law than refugee law.  State obligations 
under international human rights law also include a duty to cooperate.  
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) requires States to “take steps, individually and through interna-
tional assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maxi-
mum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full real-
ization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means”. 
The General Assembly repeated the State obligation more generally in relation to all 
human rights:  “Every state has the duty to promote through joint and separate action 
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
accordance with the Charter”.103  
Are these general provisions implemented in any more precise manner in human 
rights law? And did courts impose specific obligations onto States under their duty 
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to cooperate in the protection of human rights?  This Section first looks at the coop-
eration obligation in relation to the most absolute human rights, and then at a partic-
ular implementation in case-law imposing States to cooperate on a human rights ba-
sis.  
5.3.1. Erga Omnes Obligation of Cooperation to Protect Peremptory Norms 
While the responsibility-sharing measures implementing the cooperation and sol-
idarity principles are fundamentally of a soft-law nature, the principles themselves 
are in some instances endorsed as absolute and legally binding.  
As relevant case-law establishing State responsibility for refugee or human rights 
protection directly on the principle of cooperation is quasi non-existent, a 2018 Ad-
visory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the right of asylum 
as a human right, is noteworthy.  It firmly concludes on the erga omnes binding and 
customary character of the inter-state duty to cooperate in the observance of human 
rights:  
“la Corte recuerda que el deber de cooperación entre Estados en la promoción y obser-
vancia de los derechos humanos, es una norma de carácter erga omnes, por cuanto debe ser 
cumplida por todos los Estados, y de carácter vinculante en el derecho internacional. En 
efecto, el deber de cooperación constituye una norma consuetudinaria de derecho internacio-
nal, cristalizada en el artículo 4.2 de la Resolución 2625 […]” 104 
Also the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts identify a legally binding State obligation to cooperate when it comes to the 
protection of some absolute human rights. Articles 40 and 41 identify the duty to 
cooperate in ending any “gross or systematic failure” of “obligations arising under a 
peremptory norm of general international law”. The ILC Commentary specifies what 
such a norm entails:  
“In accordance with article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, a peremptory norm of 
 
104
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general international law is one which is: accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can 
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same char-
acter.”105  
The ILC identifies some human rights as peremptory norms: “the prohibitions 
against slavery and the slave trade, genocide, and racial discrimination and apart-
heid”, and “the prohibition against torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture”.106 
Cooperation under international law thus not only entails State obligations of 
burden-sharing out of solidarity with other States, but also one of protection out of 
solidarity with persons suffering serious and systematic human rights violations, 
such as racial discrimination and torture. No matter how vague this provision still is 
on its practical implementation, there is no way around the existence of the obligation 
on the State itself.  
When refugees suffer systematic violation of their most fundamental rights in a 
transit or hosting State, then other States have a shared, but erga omnes legal obliga-
tion to ensure those refugee rights. Besides extraterritorial jurisdiction-based respon-
sibilities, under international law States also have a responsibility to help improving 
refugee situations beyond their borders that amount to torture or racial discrimina-
tion.107   
5.3.2. Global Climate Policy and Human Rights  
A legal reasoning on how to make the general duty to cooperate more operational 
might be found in case-law dealing with other collective action problems which are 
taken before courts on the basis of human rights violations. Climate change is such 
a collective problem, whose solution would produce mutual benefits and yet can only 
be attained by a form of burden-sharing.   
In 2018 the Netherlands The Hague Appeal Court judged the responsibility of 
the Dutch State in dealing with climate change, and determined what exactly was the 
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State’s share of the global burden it should take up.108 Crucial parts of the judge’s 
reasoning could be relevant for dealing with refugee protection responsibility also: 
First, the Court accepts that the State’s responsibility for a recognised collective 
problem – the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions – is not a legal obligation with 
a direct effect flowing from international commitments.109 However, the fact that it 
concerns a global issue that can only be solved through cooperation, does not, the 
Court says, “release the State from its obligation to take measures in its territory, 
within its capabilities, which in concert with the efforts of other states provide pro-
tection”.110 In other words, the duty of cooperation to tackle a transnational issue en-
tails an obligation on States to act individually. Also, the Court continues, the multi-
lateral nature of the commitment to deal with the collective problem, demands effec-
tive remedies in order to avoid a free-rider problem, and thus enforceable judicial 
decisions.111 
Furthermore, the rights to life and to private and family life impose a duty of care 
onto the State “to take concrete actions to prevent future violations”.112 Since it is 
evident from scientific proof, that there is “a real threat of dangerous climate change, 
resulting in serious risk”, the State has “a duty to protect against this real threat”,113 
which includes preventive action.114  Previous acknowledgement by the Dutch State 
of the necessity to act in combination with scientific arguments, according to the 
Court, impose an obligation on the State to a specific minimum action – a reduction 
of 25% by 2020. Not undertaking that minimum action would be a violation of the 
duty of care under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR.115  
To draw the parallel with refugee protection is attractive – despite obvious dif-
ferences, such as the scale of the mutual benefits and shared interests in dealing with 
the collective problem (all vs. some States), the protected group (world population, 
 
108
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including nationals on the State’s territory vs. non-nationals and third States).116 Po-
tentially applicable is the argument that the duty to cooperate in order to tackle col-
lective problems that might lead to human rights violations, entails a duty of care for 
the individual State, even when it has not taken up any specific international com-
mitment. And that this duty of care includes structural preventive action in the form 
of burden-sharing that can be concretised in a legally enforceable outcome. 
Also relevant for a global refugee protection policy, is that international climate 
policy has begun to assess the specific shares of burden or responsibility of individ-
ual States on an objective scientific basis. This asymmetric allocation mechanism is 
referred to as the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’-approach (‘CBDR’),117 
and is also being explored in refugee protection policies, e.g. by calculating national 
contributions to ad hoc or potential (re)distributions measures on more objective cri-
teria, such as GDP, population size, unemployment rate or number of asylum appli-
cations.118 
5.4. – Solidarity in a Regional Context: EU Migration Law 
To effectively address collective problems, the principles of international coop-
eration and solidarity need a more precise transposition that is legally enforceable. 
In the absence of a genuine global community, it is therefore useful to turn to more 
legally integrated regional frameworks such as the EU in order to assess what role 
these principles could play in refugee protection.119 
At EU level the principles of solidarity and cooperation are enshrined in primary 
law, but have also been transposed into some mechanisms for operational burden-
sharing and responsibility allocation of the EU’s migration policy, in its internal as 
well as external dimension. 
The ‘principle of sincere cooperation’ to “assist each other in carrying out tasks 
which flow from the Treaties”, as established under Article 4(3) of the EU Treaty 
(‘TEU’), and the foundational value of solidarity in Article 2 TEU, are fundamental 
to the EU communitarian order.120 They form a constitutional paradigm of the EU, 
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“both a prerequisite for and a means of integration”, combining the altruistic value 
of redistribution, with an effective self-interest due to its judicial enforceability.121 
The Court of Justice (‘CJEU’) has recognised this fundamental value of solidarity 
for the EU order: “[…] failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States 
by the fact of their adherence to the Community strikes at the fundamental basis of 
the Community legal order.”122 
In as far as the principle of solidarity has been operationalised into the EU inter-
nal and external refugee protection policy, however, solidarity seems to function 
merely as a correction mechanism, not as a fundamental allocation criterion among 
Member States.123 Even when enforceable, the responsibility-sharing mechanisms 
exist to deal with crisis or overburdening, not as the structural framework to bring 
about an equal and fair distribution of refugee protection responsibility. 
However particular this implementation might be to the specific functioning of 
the EU, it is still useful to enquire what legal allocation criteria are applied for estab-
lishing responsibility beyond the individual Member State or common external bor-
ders, and whether they have been evaluated in case-law. This Section will first look 
at the internal, and then at the external dimension of the EU migration law and policy. 
5.4.1. Internal Dimension 
The EU’s internal migration policy set out to develop a Common European Asy-
lum System (‘CEAS’), whose, according to Article 80 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the EU (‘TFEU’) “[…] implementation shall be governed by the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, be-
tween the Member States.” “Whenever necessary, the Union acts […] shall contain 
appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.” Since Article 78(3) TFEU 
specifies the need for provisional measures in case of an emergency, the general 
provision in Article 80 should be understood as an obligation to also adopt more 
structural measures.   
The principle of fair responsibility-sharing in Article 80 qualifies the support de-
manded by the principle of solidarity: “up to the point where each Member State 
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contributes their fair share”.124 This obligation of result can be understood to include 
structural measures (“whenever necessary”) in order to prevent overburdening of a 
Member State in the first place and to avoid further structural imbalances.125 How-
ever, such a preventive structural mechanism for responsibility allocation is not in 
place in the EU. 
Following the 2015 EU so-called refugee crisis, the EU Council adopted provi-
sional measures in the form of its relocation and hot spot approach. The Council 
evaluated the situation as an emergency situation that demanded solidarity in appli-
cation of Article 78(3) TFEU, rather than a deficiency of the structural obligation of 
prevention.126 Two Council Decisions established a temporary emergency relocation 
scheme which allocated responsibility for the admission of fixed quota of asylum-
seekers with individual Member States even though some of them opposed it.127   
The Court of Justice had to evaluate the legal nature of these emergency measures 
in its judgments C-643/15 and C-647/15 of 6 September 2017, since Hungary and 
Slovakia argued that the decision did not have a solid legal basis. The Court, how-
ever, accepted that such mechanism could legally be adopted under Article 78(3) 
TFEU by a non-legislative act of the EU Council with a qualitative majority, even 
against the will of certain Member States.   
Under EU-law a legally binding mechanism was thus established to allocate re-
sponsibility to a State, not on the basis of its jurisdiction, but explicitly on the basis 
of the principle of solidarity and burden-sharing,128 and imposed by a regional polit-
ical organ, against the sovereign will of a State. This solidarity-based binding allo-
cation mechanism provides, to some extent, for a more equitable distribution of re-
sponsibilities for refugee protection among States, be it limited to the specific re-
gional emergency context of the EU. In reality, however, the mechanism has not 
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delivered the anticipated results,129 nor is it simply expandable to the external dimen-
sion of the EU migration policy for enforceable burden-sharing with overburdened 
refugee hosting countries outside the EU.  
The Dublin system is also a responsibility allocation mechanism under the 
CEAS, and one of a structural nature.130 The allocation is not based on criteria of 
internal solidarity however, but essentially on criteria of jurisdiction. Responsibility 
for the protection of a refugee is basically allocated to the Member State under whose 
territorial jurisdiction they enter the Union (Articles 12-14), or whose extraterritorial 
jurisdiction would be engaged in case their human rights are violated in other Mem-
ber States (Articles 3, 8-11, and 16).131 The discretionary clauses simply reaffirm na-
tional sovereignty of Member States to assume responsibility “on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds” (or not).132 The exception clause in Article 3(2), intended to 
prevent risks of inhumane and degrading treatment, was given a binding character in 
the 2013 Recast of the Regulation exactly in order to implement the case-law from 
the ECtHR (MSS case) and CJEU (NS case) that attributed responsibility to a Mem-
ber State on the basis of its extraterritorial jurisdiction for human right violations in 
other Member States –133 and for not using its discretionary power (under the 2003 
predecessor Dublin II Regulation) to apply the clause,.134 Even though the Dublin 
Regulation establishes a structural and a priori responsibility allocation, it does so 
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along the general criteria for establishing (extra-)territorial jurisdiction, and not in 
order to share responsibilities equitably.135    
The Dublin III Regulation also establishes a solidarity-based Early Warning and 
Prepareness Mechanism.136 Together with other implementing measures under the 
CEAS, such as the Asylum Intervention Pools coordinated by the European Asylum 
Support Office (‘EASO’) “to support Member States subject to particular pressure 
on their asylum and reception systems”,137 or the internal funding mechanisms,138 
these are tools of burden-sharing through capacity building or financial support, ra-
ther than responsibility allocation mechanisms themselves. The redistributive value 
of these measures is furthermore very limited: Member States invoking their support 
are ultimately held to the full implementation of the CEAS, contributions are volun-
tary and the funding does not primarily target asymmetric overburdening.139 These 
different instruments are not examples of structural responsibility-sharing. 
It is clear that as far as the EU’s migration policy has implemented responsibility 
allocation mechanisms in the CEAS, these are either based on emergency-driven ad 
hoc solidarity – the temporary relocation measures – or on jurisdiction criteria with-
out any structural responsibility-sharing rationale – the Dublin system.  
5.4.2. External Dimension 
As to its general external policy “characterised by close and peaceful relations 
based on cooperation” (Article 8 TEU), the EU engages “to advance in the wider 
world […], the principles of equality and solidarity”, to “build partnerships with third 
countries”, “promote multilateral solutions to common problems”, and “work for a 
high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in order to […] pro-
mote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good 
 
135
 Different reform proposals of the Dublin Regulation that try to incorporate more elements of emer-
gency and/or structural solidarity are currently under discussion. See: WAGNER et. al, cit. supra note 2, pp. 
10-13; ECRE, “Beyond Solidarity: Rights and Reform of Dublin”, February 2018, available at: 
<www.ecre.org/ecre-publications/>. 
136
 Dublin III Regulation, Preamble (22). 
137
 Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 
establishing a European Asylum Support Office (EASO Regulation), Arts. 10 and 13. 
138
 Regulation (EU) No. 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and 
repealing Decisions No. 573/2003/EC and No. 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Decision 2007/435/EC (AMIF Regulation). 
139
 TSOURDI, cit. supra note 124, p. 683. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allocating Responsibility for Refugee Protection to States … 77 
 
 
global governance”, as stipulated in Article 21 TEU. 
Article 78(2) TFEU adds an external dimension to the CEAS, consisting of “part-
nership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing inflows of 
people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection”. Cooperation here 
is a means to control migration, rather than to share protection responsibility with 
refugee hosting countries on the basis of solidarity.  
In the EU Commission’s 2008 Political Plan on Asylum and 2011 overarching 
framework of EU external migration policy, the Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (‘GAMM’), responsibility-sharing, solidarity and international cooperation 
with non-EU countries in the neighbourhood are explicitly mentioned as policy prior-
ities.140 In the first place such cooperation is meant to “enable these countries to offer 
a higher standard of international protection for asylum-seekers and displaced people 
who remain in the region of origin of conflicts or persecution” through Regional Pro-
tection Programmes, focussing on capacity-building and development. It also adds an 
“enhanced resettlement component […] as a sign of international solidarity and a key 
instrument for pursuing orderly access to durable solutions in the EU”.141  
These political declarations on resettlement and supporting protection in coun-
tries of transit and first asylum, are repeated in combination with fluctuating practical 
commitments in the 2015 European Agenda on Migration,142 its Progress Reports,143 
and other instruments such as the Partnership Framework with third countries,144 the 
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Facility for Refugees in Turkey,145 the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa,146 or the 
proposed Union Resettlement Framework.147 However genuine their burden-sharing 
potential, up until now the EU external solidarity tools are without exception depend-
ing on voluntary commitments of Member States and do not establish any legally 
binding responsibility allocation mechanism. They clearly do not form a legal basis 
for third States to claim an equitable sharing of responsibility for refugee protection 
from EU Member States.148 No cases have been brought before the Court of Justice 
by a third State claiming solidarity-based responsibility-sharing under the EU’s ex-
ternal migration policy.  
On two occasions EU Courts got the opportunity to evaluate claims by individu-
als in search for international protection in the EU. The judgements could have at-
tributed responsibility for refugee protection to a Member State, on the basis of cri-
teria other than jurisdiction, or might have brought in considerations of solidarity and 
cooperation in the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Unfortunately the 
Courts did not consider the merits of the cases, nor the potential legal relevance of 
the principle of solidarity in cooperation agreements with third countries or in the 
assessments of visa applications by refugees in third countries.  
The first case related to the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal, and could 
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have led to the assessment of whether a third country should be considered ‘safe’ 
and what consequences this entails for Member States’ responsibility for admitting 
refugees entering the Union from such a country. It had the potential of establishing 
criteria for allocating responsibility to a Member State, that are based on the effec-
tiveness of the protection in a third country that the EU has established far-reaching 
migration cooperation with.149 The first instance General Court, in its judgements of 
28 February 2017, however, dismissed the claim because it lacked the competence 
to judge the international agreement it considered the EU as an institution not to be 
part of.150 The CJEU dismissed the appeal as manifestly inadmissible.151  
The other case, X and X v. Belgium, before the Grand Chamber of the CJEU 
concerned the refusal to a refugee in a third country (Lebanon) of a humanitarian 
visa aimed at applying for asylum in an EU Member State.152 The Court could have 
evaluated whether the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the addressed State extends to 
its visa posts in third countries that cannot guarantee to refugees some of the most 
fundamental human rights. In relation to refugees in countries of first asylum that are 
overburdened, such case-law might add solidarity and equitable burden-sharing con-
siderations to the assessment of jurisdiction as a form of control over or impact on 
the human rights of refugees beyond their borders – a hybrid, stripped version of the 
solidarity principle, restricted to emergency situations. The Court, however, judged 
it to be a visa application for a long-stay, which does not fall under the EU Visa 
Code, and over which, by consequence, it has no competence.153  It will be interesting 
to see how the Strasbourg court, who has now been called to judge on the humani-
tarian visa matter, will judge the extent of the State’s responsibility and whether it 
will include solidarity considerations in situations of inhumane treatment of refugees 
in overburdened countries of first asylum.154  
The EU’s external migration policy has not produced any binding criteria to al-
locate responsibility for refugees outside the EU. All in all, in the name of solidarity, 
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the EU seems to have shifted rather than shared burdens under its externalisation 
policies, without accepting any legal responsibility for it.   
5.5. – The Potential of Cooperation and Solidarity for Refugee Protection 
International law concepts as solidarity and cooperation offer a good principled 
basis to break the deadlock in global refugee policy on a more equitable distribution 
of State responsibility for refugee protection. The principles, however, have hardly 
been implemented into sufficiently precise legal provisions, and have only led to few 
legal commitments of responsibility-sharing; frameworks for cooperation and some 
emergency mechanisms, but not binding structural obligations or a priori criteria. 
Nevertheless, the principles show some potential for a more specified application 
on refugee protection distribution.  
When considering refugee protection as a collective problem – whose solution 
entails shared interests and mutual benefits – parallels could be drawn with global 
climate policy. States might then be held responsible on the basis of their duty to 
cooperate for the collective goal if they want to avoid human rights responsibility. 
Also the erga omnes obligation to cooperate in ending serious violations of peremp-
tory human right norms, and the competence of the International Court of Justice to 
judge inter-states disputes on the application of the Refugee Status Convention offer 
tentative legal avenues for a more equitable allocation of responsibilities for refugee 
protection between refugee hosting and other States. 
At the regional level of the EU the potential of cooperation and solidarity seems 
more promising in terms of legally binding engagements.  The temporary relocation 
measures allocate a legally binding ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ 
(‘CBDR’) to all Member States for the admission of refugees – as is the case with 
the EU proposals on the Dublin reform and the resettlement scheme.155   
So far, however, it does not look like the underlying fundamental values are able 
to outweigh the considerations driving EU and Member States’ policies of external-
isation. The political priority of the external migration policy is not the equitable 
distribution of responsibilities with refugee hosting countries, but migration and bor-
der control. And whatever the rhetorical shift to more structural solidarity beyond 
crisis management in the Commission’s legislative proposals, individual Member 
States are reluctant to follow. The same is true at the internal dimension where short-
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term national interests seem to take precedence over structural solidarity, however 
fundamental for the communitarian order.   
All in all, the existing legal frameworks to enhance responsibility-sharing are ad 
hoc solutions, limited to emergency situations of overburdening or based on volun-
tary contributions to capacity-building and financial support measures. Hence the 
reluctant position of courts, on the one hand confirming the legally binding nature of 
the principles of solidarity and cooperation, on the other hand barely capable of en-
forcing State responsibility on that basis in concrete situations, where States have not 
yet gone beyond making purely principled commitments. 
6. – Third Mechanism: Allocation on the Basis of the Responsibility to 
Protect  
A last interesting frame for allocating State responsibility beyond the jurisdiction 
criteria, this chapter wants to explore, is the so called ‘Responsibility to Protect’-
doctrine (RtoP).  While its exact content and application are unclear and far from 
agreed upon in opinio juris,156 the scope of the doctrine, as it has developed in the 
last two decades, is so far limited to international humanitarian law with regard to 
the so called atrocity crimes. At best its legally binding nature can be argued to rest 
on “complementary customary law developments”.157 Applying it to refugee protec-
tion is a hypothesis so far hardly explored in legal doctrine, but might have some 
potential for the question of responsibility allocation.158  
This Section will first outline the core of the doctrine with a reference to interna-
tional case-law, before assessing its potential for global refugee protection.  
6.1. – The RtoP-doctrine in International Law  
Established under UN auspices, the central element of RtoP is that States have a 
responsibility to protect populations at risk of atrocity crimes, on their territory, but 
also beyond their borders.  The most authoritative basis for RtoP is the 2005 World 
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Summit Outcome Document of the UN General Assembly,159 which outlines the 
scope of the doctrine in two provisions (and three pillars): the general RtoP-obliga-
tion is to protect populations, whether national citizens or not, against genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, including through preventive 
measures. The prime bearer of that responsibility is the territorial State (1st pillar). 
But there is also a complementary responsibility of the international community to 
assist territorial States with their prime obligation (2nd pillar),160 and to undertake 
collective action in case the territorial State manifestly fails to fulfil its obligation 
(3rd pillar).161  
RtoP had an innovative jurisprudential application, relevant for its potential as a 
state responsibility allocation mechanism under international law. The International 
Court of Justice, in its Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia v. Serbia) 
judgment,162 refined criteria for attributing responsibility onto a so called ‘bystander 
State’ for not having fulfilled its RtoP-duty to (help) prevent genocide. The Court 
accepted the bystander State (Serbia) not to have committed, nor to have been com-
plicit in the act of genocide (in Srebrenica), but it found that State in casu nonetheless 
responsible for having failed to prevent it (in violation of Article 1 of the Genocide 
Convention).163   
The Court qualifies a State’s legal duty to prevent genocide beyond its borders 
as a due diligence obligation:164 “to employ all means reasonably available”.165 This 
is an obligation of conduct, so the State’s responsibility will be incurred when it 
“manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its 
power” –166 even though this State can only be held responsible if and once the pro-
hibited act (genocide) would ultimately be committed.167 
So, can every State be held responsible for failing the due diligence-test when a 
genocide happens somewhere in the world? To a certain extent it could, but here the 
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Court is innovatory, as it introduces a new criterion for allocating State responsibil-
ity. The Court does not attribute responsibility to all States in an undifferentiated 
way, nor to the international community as a whole, but proceeds to an in concreto 
assessment. The judgement specifies criteria to define exactly which bystander State 
bears (extraterritorial) responsibility, and to what extent:    
“[…] In this area the notion of “due diligence”, which calls for an assessment in concreto, 
is of critical importance. Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has 
duly discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one State to 
another, is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, 
or already committing, genocide.”168 
The Court clarifies that a State’s capacity to influence the acts of (potential) per-
petrators beyond its borders, itself depends on multiple factors, such as the geograph-
ical distance from the events, political or other links with the actors, or limitations 
by international law.   
The obligation to take preventive measures exists once a State with such influ-
encing capacity can reasonably be expected to be aware of the existence of a serious 
risk: 
“In fact, a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the 
instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious 
risk that genocide will be committed. From that moment onwards, if the State has available 
to it means likely to have a deterrent effect on those suspected of preparing genocide, or 
reasonably suspected of harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is under a duty to 
make such use of these means as the circumstances permit.”169 
While in principle the duty to prevent genocide rests on all States, the scope of 
each State’s responsibility to prevent it (and protect persons against it) is not deter-
mined by its territorial or extraterritorial jurisdiction, but by its reasonably knowl-
edgeable capacity to influence. What then the obligation on such bystander States to 
employ all means reasonably available exactly entails, depends on each State’s ca-
pacities in that concrete situation. 
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6.2. – The Potential of the RtoP-Doctrine for Refugee Protection 
Could taking up responsibility for the protection of refugees who find themselves 
in States of first asylum or transit be a legal obligation for bystander States under 
their R2P-duty?  
In general, the implementation of the RtoP-doctrine by the international commu-
nity has shifted from forcible intervention (3rd pillar) to more non-coercive and pro-
active measures (under the 2nd and 3rd pillars) in order to prevent atrocities from 
happening.170 In a 2009 Report, the UN Secretary-General hints at capacity-building 
and other forms of assistance in refugee protection for States to fulfil their obliga-
tions under any of the pillars of RtoP,171 and explicitly includes refugee protection in 
the ‘way forward’ for RtoP:  
“[The United Nations and its range of agencies, funds and programmes] could do that 
[the elimination of man-made scourges] much more effectively if goals relating to the re-
sponsibility to protect, including the protection of refugees and the internally displaced, were 
mainstreamed among their priorities, whether in the areas of human rights, humanitarian 
affairs, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, political affairs or development.”172 
Before focussing on the content of the State’s obligation under RtoP, however, it 
is essential to clarify what it adds as a mechanism for responsibility allocation to 
States, in comparison with other mechanisms. Advantages of RtoP are that its criteria 
are not based on jurisdiction and extend beyond territorial borders. Moreover, it is 
not in the first place directed at sanctioning individual cases of endured violations of 
international law (attribution), but rather has a more preventive objective of promot-
ing State responses to protection failures (allocation).173 Another asset is that the cus-
tomary obligation the ICJ identified allocates a CBDR to States: a qualified obliga-
tion to take preventive measures,174 based on an a priori criterion to determine the 
degree of responsibility of respective States, namely their capacity to influence.175    
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If the RtoP reasoning could be applied on global refugee protection, then the State 
who has the means to prevent the violation of refugee’s fundamental rights on the 
territory of another State, and can be expected to know about it, has an obligation to 
do all it reasonably can in order to prevent (or stop) it. 
Potential limitations for applying RtoP as a mechanism to allocate responsibility 
for refugee protection, however, concern the nature of the rights it seeks to ensure, 
as well as the scope and quality of the preventive or protection measures it demands 
of bystander States.  In order to determine the relevance of the doctrine for refugee 
protection, two questions need an answer. Firstly, could the obligation at stake go 
beyond the prevention of genocide and also include prevention of violations of ref-
ugees’ fundamental rights on the territory of another State? And secondly, could the 
obligation to employ all means reasonably available include an obligation on States 
to share responsibility for refugee protection with hosting States? 
As to the first question, on the nature of the protected rights, RtoP is strictly lim-
ited to prevention of and protection against the four atrocity crimes.176 Moreover, the 
ICJ explicitly limits its assessment to the obligation to prevent genocide, excluding 
the direct application of the Genocide judgement to other obligations to prevent acts 
prohibited by international law.177  
Though not directly applicable to violations of refugee rights under international 
law, nothing excludes per se a broader application of the responsibility criteria in 
other fields of international law.  The Court itself acknowledges the existence of 
other positive obligations “under peremptory norms or […] obligations which pro-
tect essential humanitarian values, and which might be owed erga omnes”.178 Refer-
ence can be made here once more to the provisions in Articles 40 and 41 of the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility, which identify peremptory norms whose violation 
States are held to end collectively, including the prohibition of racial discrimination, 
torture, and non-refoulement (see supra Section 4.3) – with this distinction that ‘end-
ing’ a rights violation presupposes its commission, and might thus preclude certain 
preventive action,179 though not all protective measures.  
But even without this extended interpretation of rights (violations) RtoP might 
apply to, the doctrine could offer a useful alternative to the limits of State jurisdiction 
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and the weak enforceability of international solidarity, in its application for refugees 
fleeing genocide or other atrocity crimes.  Refugees leaving their country to escape 
such persecution or violence could be entitled to protection under the RtoP, in order 
exactly to prevent genocide or stop atrocity crimes from being committed by the 
State of origin. The RtoP then first lies with their hosting State that should  guarantee 
their non-refoulement and protection under the 1951 Refugee Status Convention or 
general human rights law (1st pillar).180 Subsequently, when that State fails to do so 
due to unwillingness or incapacity, the RtoP-obligation falls on bystander States and 
obliges them to assist the hosting State (2nd pillar) or employ other means of collec-
tive action (3rd pillar).181 
As to the second question then, assuming RtoP in general could include State 
obligations to stop or prevent violations of certain refugees rights beyond its borders, 
what specific protection measures might such an extended interpretation of the in-
ternational law then include? Do assistance (2nd  pillar) and non-coercive collective 
action (3rd pillar) measures imposed by RtoP include specific actions by States be-
yond their territory, for specific categories of refugees or in specific situations?  
The Secretary-General’s 2009 Report clarifies that, while the scope of RtoP is 
limited and should not be extended to cover “other calamities”, “the response ought 
to be deep, employing the wide array of prevention and protection instruments”. The 
international community’s obligations to “encourage and help” refugee hosting 
States, and to apply “appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful means” 
could surely include measures of (common but differentiated) responsibility-sharing 
for refugee protection, such as resettlement, capacity-building or financial support.182  
A last suggestion for the potential application of RtoP for refugee protection even 
goes further in its answer to both questions concerning the nature of the protected 
rights and of the protective measures. Forced displacement of the civilian population 
is, in the context of armed conflict and under certain conditions, a crime under inter-
national criminal law,183 as well as a violation of customary international humanitarian 
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law,184 but it can also be considered a constituting element of atrocity crimes, a tactic 
or instrument of war,185 or a crime against humanity in itself.186 The RtoP-obligation to 
stop atrocity crimes from happening would then include the protection of a population 
that already is or is at risk of being forcibly displaced. The responsibility of bystander 
States in such a situation would thus include preventive measures that go beyond and 
precede strict refugee protection. As such, RtoP-obligations towards forcibly displaced 
populations in general, including internally displaced persons or persons threatened to 
be displaced – potential refugees in spe – might be the international law incentive to 
take effective measures to fight root causes of forced migration.187 
To sum up the findings on the RtoP potential for global refugee protection, there 
are two interesting, but rather antagonistic conclusions to draw. One, the R2P-mecha-
nism to allocate responsibility to States is very attractive to deal with the current prob-
lem of unequitable distribution of refugee protection responsibilities among States, 
since it establishes an a priori CBDR-criterion beyond States’ jurisdiction. And two, 
even though theoretically applicable to responsibility-sharing in refugee protection, 
the doctrine does only protect against certain violations of refugees’ fundamental 
rights, and it does not necessarily require of States that they take protective measures 
in third States to such an extent that as a minimum the standards of international refu-
gee law are guaranteed.  In other words, the bystander States’ duty to prevent atrocity 
crimes – including (secondary) forced displacement for that matter – does not entail 
an obligation to ensure all the rights under the Refugee Status Convention. However, 
it can be argued that, under R2P, States have the duty to help other States, or even 
force them to, respect the non-refoulement of refugees on their territory. 
7. – Conclusion 
Global refugee policy is in need of a legal framework that could distribute re-
sponsibility for refugee protection among States in an equitable manner and guaran-
tee effective protection for refugees. This issue being subject to persistent political 
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inhibition, is why this article has focussed on the potential of international case-law 
and theoretical arguments for international law.   
At first, it might seem effective for an individual refugee to litigate against a State 
for it to take responsibility for the violations of her or his rights (e.g. the ECtHR Hirsi 
case). However this jurisprudential avenue has important limitations. Although 
structural allocation criteria can find their origin in individual cases before regional 
human rights courts (e.g. the ECtHR MSS case), such case-law attributes responsi-
bility only a posteriori, once fundamental refugee rights have already been violated. 
Besides, attribution of responsibility to a State traditionally only happens when such 
violations happen under its jurisdiction, and prevailing migration policies are pre-
cisely designed to keep refugees out of the State’s jurisdiction. As a consequence, 
such externalisation policies cause overburdening of countries of first asylum. 
In this chapter, I searched for alternative mechanisms to address these limitations 
and deliver a more equitable distribution of responsibility among States. And while 
international case-law has, up to now, not produced a decisive legally binding crite-
rion to allocate State responsibility on an a priori basis, I have showed it did come 
up with some legal avenues with the potential to help breaking through the legal 
deadlock.  
Firstly, in situations where fundamental human rights of refugees are violated in 
hosting States, some solace might already be found in novel legal interpretations of 
the existing attribution on the basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Other States could 
be forced to accept their responsibility for refugee protection beyond their borders 
on the basis of the direct and reasonably foreseeable impact their policies have on 
the endangerment and violation of refugees right to life, even in the hands of non-
state or third State perpetrators.   
Secondly, the principles of solidarity and cooperation seem to be the most obvi-
ous candidates for equitable responsibility distribution, because they establish a pri-
ori criteria on the basis of fundamental values in inter-State relations. However, 
much of this remains theory, and little to no case-law directly applies those principles 
and States’ commitment to burden-sharing as legally binding criteria. At the mo-
ment, the principles are unenforceable because they lack implementation into precise 
legal commitments that go beyond the purely voluntary in emergency situations.  
Nonetheless, qualifying global refugee protection as a collective problem might im-
pose obligations on States to cooperate by taking preventive measures to safeguard 
human rights.  
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Thirdly, in cases where persons have or might be forcibly displaced due to very 
serious breaches of international humanitarian law or where refugees suffer viola-
tions of peremptory norms such as the non-refoulement principle, the Responsibility 
to Protect-doctrine and ICJ-jurisprudence could be used to allocate responsibility to 
States. All States have the duty to protect victims, prevent atrocity crimes, and stop 
violations of peremptory norms even beyond their own borders through assistance 
or even intervention in refugee hosting States. States even have a differentiated qual-
ified obligation to do all they reasonably can to prevent or end atrocities, which might 
include taking refugee protection measures, simply because they have the capacity 
to influence their fate. 
Each of these mechanisms has its own legal restrictions: some related to the lim-
itation in rights they protect in comparison with the totality of refugee protection 
rights – only right to life, prohibition of genocide or atrocity crimes, or peremptory 
norms –, others linked to the lack of enforceability of State measures – responsibility-
sharing such as resettlement is purely based on voluntary commitments. Combined 
however, the legally binding core of the different criteria this article has assessed – 
jurisdiction-as-impact, cooperation obligations in solving collective problems and 
obligations to prevent or stop atrocities beyond borders – could already help estab-
lishing legal responsibility of States in situations of overburdening of refugee hosting 
States that lead to serious rights violations for refugees. Even when limited to emer-
gency situations, this might have some redistributive effect. 
Still, this does not equal the sought for structural, a priori allocation mechanism 
that should guarantee an equitable distribution of responsibilities among States and 
an effective protection to refugees, just yet. This article however also showed some 
contours of how such a, more legally robust, mechanism might take form in the fu-
ture. As to the nature of rights to be protected by States with cooperative and pre-
ventive measures, international law already offers better avenues for protection when 
it concerns absolute human rights: example could be taken from the right to life basis 
in the climate case, peremptory human rights norms such as non-refoulement from 
the ILC Draft Articles, or prohibition of atrocity crimes under the RtoP-doctrine – 
and as to the specific rights guaranteed by the Refugee Status Convention, the ICJ 
could be a potential forum litis for determining respective responsibilities of Con-
tracting States. As to the scope of the measures responsible States should take, a 
‘common but differentiated responsibility’-approach (CBDR) seems have the most 
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potential in creating at least some willingness with States to commit themselves: in-
spiration could come from the – although limited – EU relocation programme, the 
capacity-to-influence-criterion from the Genocide case, or the scientifically based 
calculation of a State’s contribution to fighting climate change.  
My conclusion, for now, is that there are several promising legal avenues to be 
found in international law, but that a game-changer to legally enforce an equitable 
inter-State distribution of responsibilities for an effective refugee protection in a 
structural manner and on a global scale is lacking. As mentioned before, this article 
only had the intention to map some of the legal landscape covered by international 
case-law. More legal and practical scrutiny of these, and other, arguments is defi-
nitely needed in order to assess their legal coherence and judicial resilience. 
The urgency of the issue of equitable distribution, in a time where States inten-
tionally try to circumvent their responsibility by externalising it to other States, might 
eventually lead to serious disputes between States. Notwithstanding the valued prag-
matism of law-making, it is not to be excluded that regional or international courts 
will have to rule upon this issue one day. Refugee hosting States that are not able to 
live up to their international refugee protection obligations, due to limited capacities 
and overburdening, could grow tired of continuously demanding more solidarity and 
responsibility-sharing from other States on the policy level and take it to the courts. 
 
 
